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	 Affirmative	Action	has	been	the	cause	
of	legal	debate	since	its	inception	in	the	early	
1960s.	Though	some	view	these	policies	as	a	
means	of	equaling	the	playing	field	between	
the	minority	and	the	majority,	there	are	those	
who	see	these	policies	as	greatly	disadvantag-
ing	the	majority	as	well.	This	is	exactly	the	
scenario	which	brought	about	the	Supreme	
Court	case	of	Abigail	Noel	Fisher	v.	
University	of	Texas	at	Austin.	Abigail	Fisher	
applied	to	the	University	of	Texas	and	was	
denied	admission,	something	she	felt	was	due	
to	the	University’s	affirmative	action	policies.	
The	Court,	in	theory,	has	used	quasi-strict	
scrutiny	to	determine	whether	or	not	the	
policies	adopted	by	the	various	universities	or	
organizations	are	constitutional.	This	is	the	
test	that	should	be	used	in	the	Court’s	opinion	
of	Fisher	v.	University	of	Texas	at	Austin,	and	
this	test	will	further	the	constitutionality	of	
the	University	of	Texas’	AI/PAI	system.	
	 Before	1997,	the	in-state	admissions	
process	of	the	University	of	Texas	at	Austin	
(UT)	considered	only	two	factors:	(1)	an	
applicant’s	Academic	Index	(AI),	which	was	
computed	from	standardized	test	scores	and	
high	school	class	rank;	and	(2)	the	applicant’s	
race.	Race	was	often	a	“controlling	factor	in	
admissions.”	(App.	at	5)	(citing,	App.	162a.).	
What	this	means	is	that,	often,	University’s	
would	grant	admission	simply	due	to	the	race	
of	the	applicants,	possibly	regardless	of	
academic	standing	or	standardized	test	scores.	
The	use	of	race	in	the	PAI	system	ended	with	
the	Fifth	Circuit	Court’s	decision	in	Hopwood v 
Texas,	78	F.3d.	932	(5th	Cir.	1996).	In	an	effort	
to	maintain	the	rates	of	minority	enrollment	it	
had	before	the	Hopwood	decision	was	passed,	
the	University	of	Texas	decided	to	adjust	its	
criteria	for	admission.	In	1997,	UT	developed	
its	AI-based	admissions	calculus	with	a	new	
Personal	Achievement	Index	(PAI).	
	 The	PAI	system	consisted	of	a	weighted	
average	of	two	written	essays	and	a	“person-
al	achievement	score.”	The	PAI	“measures	
a	student’s	leadership	and	work	experience,	
awards,	extracurricular	activities,	community	
service,”	and	“special	circumstances.”	These	
special	circumstances—including	being	raised	
in	a	single-parent,	non-English	speaking,	or	
socioeconomically	disadvantaged	home	
environment	or	assuming	significant	family	
responsibilities—tended	to	“disproportionately	
affect	minority	candidates.”	Fisher	v.	Univ.	of	
Tex.	at	Austin,	645	F.	Supp.	2d	587,	591	(W.D.	
Tex.	2009),	aff’d,	631	F.3d	213	(5th	Cir.	2011)
	 Coexistent	with	the	PAI	system	created	
by	UT,	the	Texas	Legislature	passed	the	Top	
10%	law	as	their	own	response	to	the	Hopwood 
decision.	This	law	required	UT	to	grant	
automatic	admission	to	any	Texas	high	school	
student	graduating	in	the	top	10%	of	their	
class.	This	plan	took	effect	for	the	first	time	in	
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the	1998	admissions	cycle.	In	addition	to	the	
Top	10%	law,	UT’s	AI/PAI	system	would	be	
used	to	(1)	fill	those	seats	in	the	entering	class	
that	were	not	taken	up	by	those	admitted	
through	the	Top	10%	and	(2)	determine	pro-
gram	placement	for	all	students	of	the	incom-
ing	freshman	class.	The	combined	effect	of	the	
Top	10%	Law	and	the	AI/PAI	system	steadily	
increased	African-American	and	Hispanic	
admissions.	In	1999,	UT	announced	that	its	
“enrollment	levels	for	African	American	and	
Hispanic	freshman…	returned	to	those	of	
1996,	the	year	before	the	Hopwood	decision.”
	 On	June	23,	2003,	the	same	day	the	
Supreme	Court	announced	its	decision	in	
Grutter v. Bollinger1,	UT	announced	that	it	
would	“modify	its	admission	procedures	to	...	
combine	the	benefits	of	the	Top	10%	Law	with	
affirmative	action	programs	that	can	produce	
even	greater	diversity.”	Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539	U.S.	306,	(2003).	This	modification	was	a	
proposal,	created	in	2004,	to	re-consider	race	
in	the	admissions	process,	and	it	was	approved	
by	the	University’s	Board	of	Regents	that	
same	year.	This	proposal	was	set	forth	for	two	
reasons	(1)	to	overcome	“significant	
differences	between	the	racial	and	ethnic	
makeup	of	[UT’s]	undergraduate	population	
and	the	state’s	population	and	(2)	to	achieve	
classroom	diversity.	The	2004	Proposal	was	
designed	so	that	UT	could	achieve	the	same	
interest	that	this	Court	had	just	reaffirmed	
was	compelling	in	Grutter—the	“educational	
values	of	diversity.”
	 UT	determined	that	the	study	and	the	
demographic	imbalance	between	its	freshman	
class	and	the	overall	demographic	of	the	state	
showed	that	they	had	not	yet	met	a	“critical	
mass”	of	diversity.	The	2004	Proposal	also	
claimed	that	although	the	race-neutral	
policies—such	as	the	Top	10%	law—had	been	
useful	in	obtaining	a	strong	academic	student	
body,	it	failed	to	improve	to	overall	diversity	
in	the	classroom.	The	proposal	was	approved	
by	the	Regents	and	in	2004,	UT	reintroduced	
racial	preferences	by	adding	race	to	the	list	of	
possible	“special	circumstances”	that	make	up	
a	major	component	of	the	PAI.	This	policy	was	
first	introduced	with	the	admissions	class	of	
2005.
	 Abigail	Noel	Fisher	was	a	white	female	
from	the	state	of	Texas.	She	applied	for	under-
graduate	admission	to	the	University	of	Texas	
in	2008.	Fisher	was	not	in	the	top	ten	percent	
of	her	class,	which	would	have	guaranteed	her	
admission	into	the	school	under	the	Top	10%	
law.	Because	of	this,	she	was	forced	to	compete	
for	admission	with	other	non-Top	Ten	Percent	
in-state	applicants.	The	University	of	Texas	
denied	Fisher’s	application.	She	then	enrolled	
at,	and	graduated	from,	Louisiana	State	
University	(LSU).	After	being	denied	admis-
sion	to	UT	in	2008,	Fisher	filed	suit	in	the	
Western	District	of	Texas	for	damages	and	
injunctive	relief	to	challenge	UT’s	use	of	race	
in	admissions	under	the	Equal	Protection	
Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	and	
Title	IV	of	the	Civil	Rights	Act	of	1964.
	 The	Equal	Protection	Clause	of	the	14th	
Amendment	to	the	Constitution	provides	that	
“no	State	shall	deny	to	any	person	within	its	
jurisdiction	the	equal	protection	of	the	laws.”	
U.S.	CONST.,	AMDT.	14	§	2.	When	this	Court	
analyzes	a	case	under	Equal	Protection	it	must	
ask	itself	four	things	(1)	How	is	the	govern-
ment	drawing	a	distinction	among	people,	(2)	
How	does	it	discriminate?,	(3)	What	level	of	
scrutiny	applies?,	and	(4)	Does	government	
action	need	that	level	of	scrutiny?	The	third	
question	provides	the	Supreme	Court’s	root	for	
analysis	regarding	classifications	that	
distinguish	protected	classes.
1 Grutter v. Bollinger upheld the use of affirmative action in collegiate admissions. The Court was asked to review whether the admissions policies used 
by the University of Michigan, in which race was allowed to be considered as a factor of admissions, was constitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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The	Court	has	three	different	levels	of	scrutiny	
that	it	uses	to	review	state	or	federal	
distinctions	of	classes,	and	each	of	these	levels	
has	its	own	requirements	that	a	statute,	
policy,	or	law	must	satisfy	in	order	to	be	held	
constitutional.	The	Supreme	Court	of	the	
United	States	has	consistently	held	that	any	
discrimination	by	the	government	based	on	
race	“must	be	analyzed	by	a	reviewing	court	
under	strict	scrutiny.”	Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Peña, 515	U.S.	200,	227	(1995).	Thus,	
the	statute	must	serve	a	compelling	state
	interest	and	be	narrowly	tailored	to	that	
interest.	Strict	scrutiny	is	applied	to	all	racial	
classifications	in	order	to	“‘smoke	out’	illegit-
imate	uses	of	race	by	assuring	that	[govern-
ment]	is	pursuing	a	goal	important	enough	
to	warrant	the	use	of	a	highly	suspect	tool.”	
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,	488	U.S.	469,	
493,	109	S.Ct.	706,	102	L.Ed.2d	854	(1989).	
Although	all	uses	of	race-based	discrimination	
by	the	government	are	to	be	analyzed	under	
strict	scrutiny,	not	every	action	by	the	govern-
ment	is	invalidated	by	this	analysis.	The	fact	
that	a	certain	law	may	be	racially	discrimina-
tory	“says	nothing	about	the	ultimate	validity	
of	any	particular	law;	that	determination	is	
the	job	of	the	court	applying	strict	scrutiny.”	
Peña,	515	U.S.	at	230,	115	S.Ct.	2097.	As	long	
as	the	law	or	statute	serves	a	compelling	state	
interest	and	is	narrowly	tailored	to	that	
interest,	it	will	pass	strict	scrutiny	every	time	
and	will	be	considered	a	valid	law	under	the	
constitutional	guarantee	of	equal	protection.
	 For	the	past	two	decades,	however,	
this	Court	has	been	applying	another	form	of	
scrutiny	in	its	decisions	in	Affirmative	Action	
cases,	such	as	Grutter	and	Bakke.	This	form,	
which	has	often	been	labeled	quasi-strict	
scrutiny,	does	not	look	into	whether	the	issue	
is	narrowly	tailored.	Rather,	so	long	as	the	
Affirmative	Action	program	serves	to	pro-
mote	diversity	but	not	create	a	direct,	but-for	
causal	link	between	the	suspect	class	and	the	
underlying	benefits	sought,	then	the	discrim-
ination	serves	a	compelling	state	interest	and	
the	means	are	substantially	related	to	that	
interest.	Quasi-strict	scrutiny	will	only	apply	
to	Affirmative	Action	cases	where	the	discrim-
ination	is	being	used	facially.	For	example,	the	
Top	10%	plan	would	not	fall	under	this	level	
of	scrutiny	since	it	applies	to	all	races,	not	one	
suspect	class.	The	Top	10%	plan	may	have	this	
result,	and	may	very	well	have	this	purpose,	
but	because	this	affects	all	races	across	the	
board,	is	neutral	on	its	face,	and	benefits	all	
suspect	classes	and/or	races,	then	it	shall	not	
be	above	rational	relation.
	 Under	strict	scrutiny	alone,	which	
requires	the	statute	in	question	to	serve	a	
compelling	state	interest	and	also	be	narrow-
ly	tailored,	the	AI/PAI	system	created	by	UT	
would	fail	under	the	requirement	for	narrow	
tailoring.	Narrowly	tailored	requires	that	
there	be	no	other	way	the	objective	could	be	
reached.	In	the	context	of	Affirmative	Action,	
being	narrowly	tailored	is	possible	in	theory	
but	impossible	in	action,	as	Affirmative	Action	
applies	to	all	colleges	and	universities	across	
the	United	States,	each	with	their	varying	
size	and	popularity.	What	may	be	considered	
a	“diversity	goal”	at	one	college	or	university	
may	not	be	the	same	at	another.	Here,	the	Top	
10%	law	was	created	to	achieve	diversity	at	
UT,	as	was	the	AI/PAI	system	created	by	UT	
themselves.	These	two	systems	were	creat-
ed	to	achieve	the	goal	of	diversity	at	UT,	yet	
neither	can	pass	muster	as	narrowly	tailored	
because	neither	one	is	the	only	way	to	achieve	
diversity.	While	never	formally	pronounced,	
this	alternative	level	of	quasi-scrutiny	has	in	
theory	been	applied	in	the	previous	rulings	of	
this	Court,	such	as	Bakke	and	Grutter,	and	we	
will	be	well	served	to	apply	it	in	this	case.
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	 The	Court	believes	that	under	qua-
si-strict	scrutiny,	the	requirement	that	the	
process	must	serve	a	compelling	state	or		
government	interest	is	met	by	the	AI/PAI	
system	created	by	UT.	As	stated	above,	this	
Court	has	endorsed	Justice	Powell’s	view,	in	
Grutter specifically,	that	“student	body	
diversity	is	a	compelling	state	interest	that	
can	justify	the	use	of	race	in	university	
admissions.”	Grutter v. Bollinger, 539	U.S.	
306,	325	(2003).	Petitioner	argues	that	UT	
never	clearly	articulated	a	compelling	interest	
in	educational	diversity.	As	Respondent	points	
out,	“UT	simply	seeks	minority	students	with	
different	backgrounds,	different	experiences,	
and	different	perspectives.	That	is	precisely	
the	diversity	that	this	Court	has	held	univer-
sities	have	a	compelling	interest	in	seeking.”	
(Rep.	at	15).	In	light	of	this,	the	Court			
endorses	Justice	Powell’s	view	in	Marks, and	
on	that	endorsement,	agrees	with	the	Respon-
dent’s	point	on	the	compelling	interest	of	the	
University.	This	Court,	as	well	as	other	insti-
tutions	in	this	country,	has	noted	that	student	
body	diversity,	in	and	of	itself,	is	a	compelling	
state	interest.	This	is	due	to	the	added	
benefits,	some	of	which	UT	even	mentioned	
in	their	2004	Proposal,	that	are	accomplished	
with	diversity.	Some	of	these	benefits,	as	men-
tioned	by	UT	itself,	of	the	AI/PAI	system	is	
that	it	seeks	to	“provide	an	educational	setting	
that	fosters	cross-racial	understanding,	
provides	enlightened	discussion	and	learn-
ing,	and	prepares	students	to	function	in	an	
increasingly	diverse	workforce	and	society”.	
(Rep.	at	26).
	 The	interest	of	UT,	as	stated	above,	is	
the	overall	interest	in	student	body	diversity	
at	the	university.	When	the	2004	Proposal	was	
first	considered,	UT	ran	a	study	throughout	
the	university	in	order	to	assess	their	current	
levels	of	diversity.	According	to	the	Respon-
dent,	“UT’s	study	showed	that	there	were	zero	
or	one	African-American	students	in	90%	of	
the	undergraduate	classrooms	of	the	most	
typical	size	(5-24	students).	The	classroom	
diversity	study	itself	stated	that	UT’s	objective	
was	the	educational	benefits	of	diversity,	not	
some	discrete	“‘classroom	diversity’	target”.	
(Rep.	at	26,	27).	UT	is	a	large	university	in	
Texas,	with	many	classrooms	that	fall	within	
this	“most	typical	size”	that	was	surveyed.	For	
there	to	be	one,	and	sometimes	not	even	one,	
African-American	student	in	90%	of	the	class-
rooms	is	a	grave	cause	for	concern	for	UT	and	
justifies	a	compelling	interest	for	the	
university.	We	therefore	find	that	this	system	
passes	the	compelling	interest	requirement,	
and	turn	to	consideration	of	substantial	
relation	and	the	but-for	test.
	 From	the	very	beginning,	it	is	evident	
that	this	system	created	by	UT	is	substantially	
related	to	the	interest	of	diversity	at	the	Uni-
versity.	Through	the	consideration	of	race	in	
the	application	process,	as	well	as	the	“special	
circumstances”	aspect,	it	is	evident	that	these	
aspects	were	implemented	with	the	effect	and	
purpose	of	increasing	diversity	at	UT.	Peti-
tioner	argues	that	“where	racial	classifications	
have	only	a	‘minimal	impact’	in	advancing	
the	compelling	interest,	it	‘casts	doubt	on	the	
necessity	of	using	such	classifications”	in	the	
first	place	and	demonstrates	that	race-neutral	
alternatives	would	have	worked	about	as	well.	
(App.	at	46-47)	(citing,	Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No.	1,	551	U.S.	701.	at	734	(2007).	We	find	this	
argument	unpersuasive,	and	rather	endorse	
Judge	Garza’s	view,	in	his	dissent	in	the	Fifth	
Circuit,	that	“diversity	cannot	be	gauged	with	
reference	to	numbers	alone,”	and	“a	race-
conscious	admissions	plan	need	not	have	a	
‘dramatic	or	lopsided	impact’	on	minority	
enrollment	numbers	to	survive	strict	scrutiny”.	
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	 Finally,	when	considering	the	but-for	
test,	UT’s	policy	must	make	sure	that	it	serves	
to	promote	diversity,	which	this	Court	has	
already	stated	it	does,	but	does	not	create	a	
direct,	but-for	causal	link	between	the	suspect	
class	and	the	underlying	benefits	sought.	That	
benefit	in	this	case	being	admission	into	the	
University	of	Texas.	As	the	Respondent,	UT,	
points	out,	its	admissions	process	is	“not all	
about	race.	UT	appreciates	that	every	student	
brings	a	lot	of	other	diversity	pieces	with	them.	
Race…simply	provides	a	contextual	back-
ground	for	the	student’s	achievements…	The	
point	of	holistic	review	is	that	[s]tudents	...	are	
more	than	just	their	race.”	(Rep.	at	34).	Rather	
than	using	race	in	a	situation	where	there	is	
a	direct	causal	link	between	the	suspect	class	
and	the	underlying	benefits	sought,	such	as	
the	quota	system,	it	is	nothing	more	than	an	
extra	consideration	for	admission	profession-
als	to	look	at	when	making	decisions	for	the	
remaining	25%	of	seats	not	covered	by	the	Top	
10%	Rule.	We	therefore	conclude	our	analysis.	
However,	we	also	find	that	the	UT	Policy	
satisfies	the	but-for	test	and	thus	fully	satisfies	
all	three	parts	of	the	quasi-strict	scrutiny.
 
	 In	this	case,	the	Supreme	Court	has	
been	called	on	to	determine	whether	the	UT	
admissions	policy	is	constitutional	under	the	
Equal	Protection	Clause	of	the	Fourteenth	
Amendment	and	Title	IV	of	the	Civil	Rights	
Act	of	1964.	In	this	instance,	a	case	arising	
due	to	Affirmative	Action	policy,	we	reaffirm	
our	prior	rulings	and	once	again	state	that	the	
appropriate	test	is	that	of	quasi-strict	scrutiny.	
It	is	therefore	the	determination	of	this	Court,	
that	the	UT	admissions	policy	serves	a	
compelling	state	interest.	As	this	Court	has	
consistently	found,	and	continues	to	find	today,	
student	body	diversity	is	a	compelling	state	
interest.	Furthermore,	the	plan	is	substantial-
ly	related	to	that	interest,	as	it	was	created	for	
the	purpose,	and	also	has	the	effect	of	
increasing	diversity	at	the	institution.	To	be	
sure,	this	plan	does	not	serve	as	a	but-for	
causal	link	between	the	suspect	class	and	the	
underlying	benefit	sought,	as	we	find	that	the	
use	of	race	is	just	another	consideration	in	the	
admissions	process.	In	light	of	the	above,	the	
Supreme	Court	hold	that	the	UT	admissions	
policy,	created	for	the	purpose	of	increasing	
student	body	diversity,	is	nothing	short	of	
constitutional.
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